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defendant is under no burden to help the plaintiff move the main
case-there is nothing defendant can accomplish by advancing the
indemnity claim since it depends upon the outcome of the main
claim. The New Paltz result would be understandable if the main
claim were ready and if it were shown that only the third-party
claim had been delayed. There was, however, no such showing.
Thus, New Paltz advocates the proposition that the defendant may
be compelled to push to completion a claim for indemnity that does
not have its genesis until the main claim has decided that the
defendant is entitled to indemnity.
CPLR 3216: Failure to perfect appeal subject to dismissal for
neglect to prosecute.
Attention should also be directed to laxity in the perfection of
appeals. The first department, again the leader in the war on
lethargic claimants, has already made clear its intolerance for
unexcused delay at this stage.1 7 9 Only recently, the fourth department which previously had, by its own admission, granted extensions
to perfect appeals as a matter of course notwithstanding blatant
disobedience to the rules of the department and directives of the
court, altered its policy. It was held in Caira v. McKenn&80 that
real justification, by affidavit, would be essential to resist dismissal
for unexcused neglect in the process of appealing to the fourth
department.
The trend by the courts toward increased dismissals for neglect
to prosecute is evident from initial summons to final judgment on
appeal and it would appear that this trend is continuing. It encourages the expeditious disposition of litigation and relief to overburdened calendars and offers a better opportunity for justice to all
parties.
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CPLR 3404: Automatic dismissals.
In Tactuk v. Freiberg,'8 ' an action for wrongful death and
personal injuries, the lower court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate
an "automatic" dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3404. This section
specifically states that when a case is struck from the calendar, or
left unanswered and not restored within one year, it is deemed
abandoned and automatically dismissed. 182
179 Tonkonogy v. Jaffin,
Dep't 1964).
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182 CPLR 3404.
See 4
PRAcicEn
13404.02 (1965).

21 App. Div. 2d 264, 249 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st
261 N.Y.S.2d 365 (4th Dep't 1965).
261 N.Y.S.2d 438 (2d Dep't 1965).
WEiNsTElN, Kora & MIm.Ia, NEw YoRK CrvmI

1966 ]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

In reversing the decision of the lower court, the appellate
division, second department, held that CPLR 3404 does not apply
where the parties are "actively engaged in settlement negotiations"
and where a motion is pending. In preserving the plaintiff's cause3
of action, the appellate court relied primarily on Marco v. Sachs.'
In that case, the Court of Appeals indicated that a case would not
be automatically dismissed under RCP 302(2) (the analogue of
CPLR 3404) unless there was an "intent to abandon the litigation." 184 The Court in Marco further stated that the wording of
RCP 302(2) "suggests a presumption (of abandonment) rather
than a fixed and immutable policy of dismissal, and it would seem
that the rule was never intended to apply to a case where litigation
in a cause was actually in progress.' 8 5
The above quoted language does not appear to make contemporaneous litigation a prerequisite to restoration, but rather it
indicates that such litigation is merely indicative of the parties'
intention not to abandon the case. The gravamen of restoration is,
therefore, that by their activity the parties manifest to the court
their intention not to abandon the cause. Based upon this construction, it is submitted that the court in the instant case could have
vacated the dismissal solely upon the parties' engagement in settlement negotiations.
While there is no case law expressly holding that settlement
negotiations in themselves would be sufficient evidence of the parties'
desire to preserve the litigation so as to vacate the dismissal, dicta
in several cases lend support to such a proposition. 8 8 As a further
consideration, would it not be patently illogical and highly inequitable for a court to label "abandoned" a case in which the parties,
through their active participation in serious settlement negotiations,
evidence a clear intention not to abandon the case ?' s7 As one
authority has stated, "abandonment is more than a constructive
concept; it is based on an assumption of lack of concern with the
outcome .... 1881 It would be contrary to reason to hold that parties
actively engaged in settlement negotiations are unconcerned about
the outcome of the litigation.
10 N.Y2d 542, 181 N.E2d 392, 226 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
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